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Abstract
Access control in decentralised collaborative systems
present huge challenges especially where many au-
tonomous entities including organisations, humans,
software agents from different security domains seek to
access and share resources in a secure and controlled
way. Automated trust negotiation (ATN) is one ap-
proach that has been proposed for trust discovery and
realisation, which enables entities viz. strangers to ac-
cess resources across autonomous boundaries through
iterative exchange of credentials. Various negotiation
strategies have been proposed to protect credential dis-
closure during trust negotiations. However in some
domains such as e-Health, not all entities are willing
to negotiate credentials or disclose access policies di-
rectly to strangers regardless of negotiation strategies
and instead prefer to negotiate and disclose sensitive
information only to strangers within what we refer to
as a circle of trust. In this paper, we introduce a for-
mal model to describe how locally trusted intermediary
parties can provide multiple negotiation and delegations
hops to protect credentials and access policies. We pro-
pose a dynamic trust negotiations (DTN) model that
not only protects sensitive information from disclosure
but also reduces semantic issues that exist with creden-
tials in decentralised systems. This work is currently
being explored and implemented within the e-health do-
main: specifically in the MRC-funded Virtual Organi-
sation for Trials of Epidemiological Studies (VOTES)
project.
Index Terms – Trust Negotiations, Security, P2P
1 Introduction
Access control in decentralised collaborative systems
present huge challenges where many autonomous en-
tities such as organisations, humans, software agents
from different security domains seek to access and share
resources in a secure and controlled way. It is largely
understood how to control access to resources within a
given domain, however considerable challenges remain
with regards to decentralised access control between
collaborating autonomous remote entities. The ideal
solution would be a scalable distributed security ap-
proach where trust is easily discovered and realised and
used to securely extend site autonomy to support col-
laborative work.
Organisations are often aware that certain resources
exist in other organisations but usually will have to
negotiate access rights or privileges with those target
organisations to access their resources. In some cases,
a target organisation publishes those resources they are
willing to share with other organisations on a per col-
laboration basis. In other words an organisation or a
user in an organisation will know that certain resources
exist and yet lack the means to access them because
they do not have appropriate credentials. When this
happens, the requesting organisation will initiate a ne-
gotiation process with the target organisation for priv-
ileges typically given as attributes for resource shar-
ing. These agreements are often difficult to reach be-
cause of different organisational security requirements.
The agreement challenge is exacerbated when the num-
ber of organisations involved in the agreement stage is
large and dynamic. A fundamental cause of this is
the lack of co-ordination and acceptance of agreements
by the wider communities. A common approach for
inter-site security policies is pre-exchange of security
credentials between organisations. Among the disad-
vantages to this method are (a) credentials revocation
(b) credentials re-distribution and (c) credentials du-
plication/redundancy.
In most cases when an organisation advertises the
availability of some of their resources (for resource
discovery), they already have localised access control
policies in place that protect it from unauthorised us-
age. For example an NHS hospital might be willing to
make available some statistical data to any organisa-
tion within the health services or health-research insti-
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tutions. But proving your identity (authentication) as
a researcher from a health-research institution is not
sufficient to guarantee access without proper privileges
(authorisation) because of local security policies that
exist at the hospital. In the health domain there is an
urgent need to share and collaborate e.g. to identify
potential participants, seek consents, recruit partici-
pants, collect data from on-going trials at all trial sites
and manage on-going studies. All these will require ac-
cess to electronic health records such as patient demo-
graphics, patient medical history, test results, current
treatment notes, past and current prescriptions, and so
forth. However the lack of access to this geographically
and autonomously distributed information may delay
a trial or affect the success of a trial.
This paper introduces a formal model of Dynamic
Trust Negotiation (DTN) to address the heterogeneous
and autonomous federation of credentials and policies.
The model describes how locally trusted intermediary
parties can provide multiple negotiation and delega-
tions hops to help establish trust between strangers.
The model protects credentials and access policies and
reduces credential semantic issues that exist in decen-
tralised systems. In Section 2 we review negotiations
and inter -organisation interactions. Section 3 intro-
duces trust negotiation in decentralised systems. Sec-
tion 4 presents a trust discovery model using graphs.
Section 5 introduces the system used to explore these
models within the MRC funded Virtual Organisation
for Trials of Epidemiological Studies (VOTES) project,
and Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2 Background
Negotiations plays an important role in open perva-
sive/ubiquitous computing. Typically these forms of
negotiation span two major system domains: agent
technology and credential-based authorisation systems.
Agent technology fits into this problem space as it deals
with issues of distribution heterogeneity and auton-
omy are found in ubiquitous environments such as grid
environment. Similarly credential-based authorisation
that primarily supports intra-organisation access con-
trol needs to be extended to support the challenge of
inter -organisation interactions.
Agent-based negotiation introduces the concept of
dialogue between two agents in order to obtain re-
sources [1, 2]. In multi-agent systems, where agents are
autonomous as they often represent different individ-
uals or organisations, negotiation is the main form of
interaction between them as they cannot perform effec-
tively on their own in order to achieve their objectives.
[1, 3, 4] discusses some properties that serve as bases for
negotiation in a multi-agent domain. Properties such
as competitive or co-operative behaviours of agents,
such as negotiation protocols (auction, heuristic, and
argumentation) and negotiation strategies, provide in-
sight into negotiation issues as in trust negotiation.
[4] investigates negotiation between partners in loose
inter-organisation workflow (IOW) which is similar to
the type of cooperation that exists in Grid-based vir-
tual organisations (VOs). Other issues common to
both IOW and VO include: finding partners to inter-
act with; contracts specification as in VO agreements
between partners, and workflow execution. Negotia-
tion between partners typically follows the discovery
of partners in order to realise a service. Although the
choice of partners often depends on what is or can be
negotiated between them.
Credential-based systems include identity-based sys-
tems and property-based systems. Identity-based
systems use entity identity or names for authenti-
cation and authorisation purposes. These identity-
based systems cannot provide the base for negotiating
trust between unknown entities (strangers). However,
property-based systems also known as attribute-based
systems, use attribute certificates and policy assertions
to control access to resources in distributed environ-
ments. The use of policy assertions enables multiple
resource providers to co-exist in the same environment.
Thus when an entity tries to access a resource, the en-
tity provides its certificates to the policy enforcement
engine that decides if access conditions are satisfied.
These systems provide the base for negotiating trust
between strangers.
The need to exchange credentials between unknown
entities introduces the concept of trust negotiation
(TN) otherwise known as automated trust negotiation
(ATN)[5]. ATN is an approach for trust establishment
between strangers through the exchange of sensitive
information such as digital credentials. Trust is estab-
lished through an iterative but cautious bilateral dis-
closure of credentials [6, 7]. Digital credentials which
are analogous to paper credentials are digital asser-
tions about a credential owner signed by the creden-
tial issuer. Currently digital credentials are widely im-
plemented using X.509 certificates [8]. The credential
is signed using the issuers private key and the signed
credential is verified with the issuers public key. A
credential contains attributes that describe properties
of the owner asserted by the issuer. Credentials also
contain the public key of the credential owner through
which the owner can demonstrate its ownership by the
corresponding private key. Negotiating these sensitive
credentials without any human intervention is the basis
of trust establishment [6, 9].
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In this paper we explore how credentials can be ne-
gotiated as the basis to support collaborative research
between autonomous, distributed resources. We note
that in sensitive domains such as e-health it is often
impossible to deal with strangers owing to the risk in-
volved. This makes it much more difficult to support
automated trust negotiations. However when an inter-
mediary party is introduced that is known to both par-
ties (strangers) then the associated risks are reduced
since credentials are not perceived to be disclosed to
strangers. DTN on the other hand negotiates creden-
tials between known parties who act as mediators on
behalf of strangers.
3 Trust Negotiation in Collabo-
rative Systems
In trust negotiations, we regard credentials also as re-
sources that can be negotiated. In collaborative re-
search environments such credentials are often used for
access control.
3.1 Access Control
Access to resources needs to be controlled and man-
aged especially in ensuring that operations carried out
on those resources are adequately authorised. Exam-
ples of these resources could be data being provided
or services being rendered. Decisions have to be made
and enforced in order to protect resources from unau-
thorised disclosure and alterations while confidentiality
and privacy needs to be ensured where needed. Ac-
cess management systems such as attribute-based ac-
cess control systems (ABAC)[10, 11, 12] use informa-
tion contained in policies and credentials to manage
access. Desirable properties of an attribute-based ac-
cess control (ABAC) system include:
1. Decentralised attributes where an entity’s at-
tribute can be asserted by another entity.
2. Delegation of attribute authority in which the au-
thority over an attribute can be delegated to an-
other entity.
3. Attribute intersection in which combination of
attributes are used to infer another entity’s at-
tribute(s).
4. Attribute inference where an attribute can be in-
ferred through another attribute.
5. Attribute fields useful for parameterised attributes
such as defining quantities in a credential.
3.2 Modelling Access Control
Key elements of an access control model are: E: En-
vironment which defines the context or environment
of the access request: e0, e1, ..., ek ∈ E, e.g. an op-
tional variable representing different virtual organisa-
tions (VOs); S: Subject, defining the entity such as
user, software agent and organisation: s0, s1, ..., sk ∈ S;
OBJ : Object, resources or targets more generally:
obj0, obj1, ..., objk ∈ OBJ ; ACT : Action, actions on
objects: act0, act1, ..., actk ∈ ACT ; P : Permission,
P = ACT ×OBJ×E that is P = < acti, obji, ei >; R:
Role is defined as S.r(h1, ..., hn) where r is role name,
hi is parameter for parameterised role’s r and S is the
entity who has the role; PS: Permissions to role rela-
tion, PS ⊆ P ×R.
Based on the Role-based Trust-management (RT)
language defined for attribute-based access control
(ABAC) systems in [11], we define credentials as fol-
lows:
+ S.r(h1, ..., hn) ← A means S and A are possibly
the same or S asserts that A has the attribute
R = r.(h1, ..., hn), i.e. A is a member of S.
+ S.r(h1, ..., hn) ← A.r1(l1, ..., ln) means S.r con-
tains an entity that has r1, that is r1(l1, ..., ln) ∈
r(h1, ..., hn). Possibly, S and A are same entity or
that S delegates to A if r and r1 are same.
+ S.R ← A1.R1 ∩ ... ∩ Ak.Rk is role intersections,
which means an entity that has R1, R2, ..., and Rk
is a member of S.R.
+ S.R← S.R1.R2 is a role-linkage, which means S.R
contains B.R2 if B is a member of S.R1. This is
also viewed as a form of attribute-based delega-
tion.
3.3 Automated Trust Negotiation
Access control policies (a.k.a policies) and credentials
can be defined with languages with well formed seman-
tics and expressed as finite sets of statements[13]. Us-
ing propositional logic as in [14] we define a policy for
resource D as:
PD → FD(C1, C2, ..., Ck)
where C1, C2, ..., Ck are credentials that must be satis-
fied by the other party; FD is an expression that en-
tails these credentials, boolean operators ∨ and ∧, and
any parenthesis where needed. Access is granted to
a resource D when the other party discloses Ci that
satisfies Ck and when FD(C1, C2, ..., Ck) is evaluated
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to true. For example Bob wants to access cancer pa-
tients records D at hospital X as part of a Cancer clin-
ical trial (XCT). Hospital X’s policy requires the re-
questor to be an investigator or clinician on the XCT
clinical trial before access can be granted. Thus Bob
provides credentials such as CBob1 =“Investigator” or
CBob2 =“Clinician” and C
Bob
3 =“XCT”, which can be
expressed as PD → (CBob1 ∨ CBob2 ) ∧ CBob3 . Similarly,
Bob’s access control policies may specify that that the
requesting target, which in this case is hospital X prove
its identity amongst other properties. So for Bob’s cre-
dential we have: PCBob → FCBob(C1, C2, ..., Ck). In a
nutshell, the policy of a resource is satisfied when the
other party discloses a sequence of credentials for that
resource (C1, C2, ..., Ck). A resource R is said to be
unprotected if its access control policy is always sat-
isfied R → true or C → true. A resource is said to
have a denial policy if R→ false, that is no credential
can satisfy that policy or that resource is not meant for
disclosure.
[11, 14] illustrated with examples how trust is estab-
lished between two peers P1 and P2 with each of the
peers requesting a series of credentials from each other
and how requesting a credential in the series might trig-
ger requests for credentials from the other party. One
problem with exchanging credentials this way is that
a point of deadlock is reached where both parties wait
on each other to disclose the next credential. This cre-
dential negotiation deadlock is explained in [14], which
occurs whenever their is cyclic credential interdepen-
dency: CX2 ← CBob2 and CBob2 ← CX2 , where their
credential disclosure policies disregards who is on first.
[14] also proposed a possible solution to credentials ne-
gotiation deadlock. The solution introduces a collab-
orative peer to the negotiation process called a locally
trusted third party (LTTP). An LTTP acts as a medi-
ator by disclosing credentials and policy rules to nego-
tiating parties whenever cyclic interdependency occurs
to facilitate trust negotiation. A peer Pc is said to be
a LTTP for Pa and Pb where Pc has previously suc-
cessfully exchanged and cached several credentials on
more than one occasion at different times with both
Pa and Pb. Hence Pa and Pb ask Pc which they both
trust to act as their LTTP. Pc then releases missing
credentials to both parties, which breaks the cyclic in-
terdependency.
ATN is not all about credential disclosure but also
about access policy disclosure. [15, 6, 9, 11] all present
models for negotiation strategies to protect the disclo-
sure of sensitive credentials. However for a negotiation
to succeed the negotiating peers must operate using the
same strategies. [13] discusses the use of interoperable
strategies for credential exchange and why every entity
should be free to use whatever strategy they choose
before or during negotiation. Two strategies are said
to interoperate if trust negotiation succeeds whenever
it is possible. A family of disclosure tree strategies was
presented which are all mutually interoperable. How-
ever we argue that if a trust negotiation succeeds, ac-
cess policies would have been disclosed. In some con-
text, these access policies are sensitive information that
needs to be protected. In this paper we present a model
that uses multiple negotiation and delegations hops to
protect credentials and access policies.
3.4 Dynamic Trust Negotiation
Dynamic trust negotiation (DTN) also known as dy-
namic negotiation through delegated trust (DNDT)
is the process of negotiating trust between two non-
trusting entities through trusted intermediary entities.
The process involves trust delegations through interme-
diary entities on behalf of these non-trusting entities.
Any entity can serve as a negotiator for other entities
provided it is trusted by the two non-trusting entities
or by their intermediaries. Like ATN, DTN introduces
a mediator we call locally trusted intermediary party
(LTIP) similar to LTTP [14] in ATN. Unlike ATN, an
LTIP is just one of the multiple LTIP (many hops) that
can exist in a trust negotiation between two peers.
Consider an example of dynamic trust negotiation
between two peers P1 and P2, where P1 is a requestor
and P2 is the domain of the resource R. With the
understanding that credentials are also resources, we
have two forms of resources in this example: Objects
and Credentials. P1 wants to access an object resource
on P2. P1 will have to first negotiate it’s credential
resource1 for P2’s credential. P2 has never negotiated
with P1 and its only open for negotiation with peers
it has previously negotiated with such as P3. We call
this a circle of trust, shown in Figure 1. Suppose P2’s
access policy for R is:
R1, R2 ⊆ R
R1 ← CP31 ∧ CP32
R2 ← CP33
which means P2 requires credential C1 and C2 from P3
for resource R1 while C3 is required for R2. Suppose
P1 belongs to the P3 circle of trust and that P3 access
1From here on our reference to resource is mainly credential.
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Figure 1: Circle of Trust
policy with P1 is:
CP31 ← CP11 ∧ CP12
CP32 ← CP13
CP33 ← CP13 ∧ CP14
To access R1, P1 would have to negotiate with P3 by
making available:
{CP11 , CP12 , CP13 }
while P3 will negotiate on behalf of P1 with:
{CP31 , CP32 }
However if P1 only makes available:
{CP13 , CP14 }
then P3 can only negotiate on behalf of P1 with:
{CP33 }
which will be for P2’s R2 and not R1.
From the above example it would be seen that, P3
serves as a link peer known as LTIP for the trust ne-
gotiation between P2 and P1.
P2 ← P3
P2 ← P3.P1
In a typical trust negotiation where a circle of trust
exists, you often find multiple LTIP’s involved in the
trust negotiation. Each of the involved LTIP acts as
a hop or a link to the next LTIP and/or finally to the
target peer.
4 Dynamic Trust Negotiation
Model
Consider one of the typical scenarios of a DTN model.
Rob is a healthcare professional based at Glasgow
Figure 2: Using Dynamic Trust Negotiation in Clinical
Trials Collaborative Environment
Royal Infirmary (GRI) and the principal investigator
for the Scottish coronary clinical trial (SCCT) with role
Investigator. He logs into the trial portal and his cre-
dentials are pulled from his domains credential reposi-
tory. He decides to query for consented patient records
for prospective participants. The portal pushes his cre-
dentials and query to GRI Access Manger (GRI-AM).
GRI-AM sends a request for data along with Rob’s In-
vestigator credentials to peers that are in a static trust
relationship with GRI such as the Glasgow Southern
General Hospital Access Manager (GSG-AM). Query
results are returned if applicable based on Rob’s cre-
dentials and delegated privileges at GSG. GSG-AM
sends a request using credentials it has delegated to
Rob through GRI to other peers that GSG is in a
static trust relationship with such as Royal Infirmary
of Edinburgh Access Manager (RIE-AM). RIE-AM re-
sponds with delegated credentials through GSG-AM to
GRI-AM. In addition to that RIE-AM also sends a re-
quest using credentials it has delegated to Rob through
SGG-AM to other peers that RIE is in static trust re-
lationship with. GRI, GSG, RIE are trust-pathways.
The request process continues with nodes joining the
trust-pathways until all possible trust paths are ex-
ploited. These negotiated credentials are forward to
GRI-AM, which then makes query request with these
credentials on behalf of Rob to each node’s Resource
Manager (RM). Figure 2 shows a collaborative environ-
ment that abstracts a negotiation layer (DTN) from an
authorisation layer.
In Figure 3, a network is shown and represented as
a non-negative, bi-directional, acyclic graph. The net-
work is denoted as G(V,E). The network is an abstrac-
tion of negotiation layer shown in Figure 2, which is
introduced to augment an authorisation layer.
The Node set V is an abstraction of an autonomous
organisation in a network of organisations. A node
refers to an end point in a communication chain and
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Figure 3: A network of collaborating health organisa-
tion
it consists of security credentials, i.e. roles, attributes,
rules set or constraints, entities keys that are unique
and in use at given end point. The Edge set E rep-
resents the direction of trust, which consists of labels,
properties and constraints. The Edge also signifies the
existence of a Trust-Contract (TC) between two Nodes,
which is shown as a bi-directed arc between two Nodes.
A TC m is a static agreement between two nodes (u, v)
that states the mapping/relationship between two cre-
dentials (cu, cv). That is:
m = (u, v) where u, v ∈ V
That is,
f : cu → cv : m 7→ f(m)
A set of m ∈ M exists between two nodes when more
than one credential mapping is agreed between them,
that is:
M = ({u0, v0}, {u1, v1}, ..., {uk, vk})
4.1 Trust Discovery
In DTN we use a variant of the link state routing al-
gorithm to discover chains of trusts or trust-pathways,
which are necessary before credentials can be negoti-
ated. The algorithm uses the weight w on paths/links,
that is the cardinality of trust-contract sets that ex-
ist between nodes. In other words, the weight w
is the sum of all m’s that exist between two nodes:
w =
∑
M(u,v).
Since DTN is not about shortest paths to a desti-
nation, the algorithm is modified to accommodate the
discovery of multiple paths to a destination. Similarly
as notification messages are sensitive information, no-
tifications are restricted to trusted peers and messages
are encrypted with shared keys or key pairs. Once each
node collates routing information, nodes judiciously
select appropriate nodes with respect to destination
nodes.
Each node u keeps a list of nodes v0, v1, ..., vk ∈ V
in it’s circle of trust (cot) along with their respective
weights, encryption keys and rules-set also known as
constraints. When an entity at a node S in figure 3,
makes a request for remote resources2, say a list of can-
cer patients and a discovery service suggests relevant
data exists at nodes I, J,D, node S will check for nodes
I, J,D in it’s cot. Node S will issue a query request for
cancer patients from nodes I, J which are in it’s cot.
The request is made with the credentials of the entity
making the request. However if trust-contracts that
contains those user credentials do not exist at that re-
mote node, a trust-contract request is raised for those
credentials. Alternatively, a dynamic trust negotiation
(DTN) request through other nodes is explored. De-
tails of a trust-contract request and formation are out-
side the scope of this paper.
Node D does not exist in S’s cot, hence a DTN re-
quest is initiated. A DTN request starts off with de-
termining trust-pathways to destination nodes if such
information does not already exist in the node’s trust-
pathways table. The trust-pathways table contains
lists of cot nodes that act as ‘next hops’ or links to non-
cot nodes. The list is prioritised based on the weights
of those links. The trust-pathways table is updated as
follows.
Link Request Assuming figure 3 where S is the
source node and D is the destination node, S sends
link request (LREQ) to nodes that exist in it’s cot.
Node S contain nodes I, J,K in cot and they will all
receive a LREQ. A typical LREQ has the following
properties: a source distinguished name, destination
distinguished name, a sequence number and a message
authentication code (MAC) which is computed using a
shared key.
LREQ : {DNs, DNd, Seqnum}+K12(MAC)
Where DNs and DNd are distinguished names for
source and destination nodes respectively. The se-
quence number Seqnum is a unique number main-
tained by the source node for each request made for
a destination node. K12(MAC) is a message authenti-
cation code computed using K12, which is a key shared
between two nodes i.e. sender node and receiver node.
Shared keys are created when two nodes first negotiate
for a trust-contract. Alternatively a public-private key
pair could be used for signing the MAC.
Each node implements a LREQ table that stores link
requests it receives from source nodes and intermediary
nodes. When a non-destination node receives a LREQ,
it checks its cot to see if the sender is a trusted node,
reads the MAC using their shared key and forwards
2We assume that a discovery service exists that returns a list
of target nodes providing certain resources.
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the message to other trusted nodes re-computing the
MAC using keys it shares with those nodes. It then
stores that node as ‘next hop’ to the source node in
its trust-pathways table. Similarly, if it receives the
same LREQ from multiple nodes, it stores those nodes
as ‘next hop’ to the source node in its trust-pathways
table.
Link Reply The destination node DNd, on re-
ceiving an LREQ, creates a link reply (LREP) which
is sent to all nodes it receives a LREQ from.
LREP : {DNd, DNs, Seqnum}+K12(MAC)
Where DNd and DNs are distinguished names for des-
tination and source nodes respectively. The sequence
number Seqnum is a unique number maintained by the
destination node for each reply made to a source node.
K12(MAC) is a message authentication code computed
using K12, which is a key shared between two nodes i.e.
sender node and receiver node.
When a non-source node receives a LREP, it checks
it’s cot for the sender, checks for the corresponding
LREQ in its LREQ table and if valid, verifies the MAC
using its key. For every valid MAC, a node updates it’s
trust-pathways table registering the LREP sender node
as the ’next-hop’ to the destination node. The non-
source node also re-broadcast the LREP to other nodes
it receives a LREQ from but re-compute the MACs
using keys it shares with those nodes.
Link Update A node may revoke it’s trust con-
tracts with other nodes and thus renders some links
in the trust chains invalid. Similarly new nodes may
be added at any time and new trust relations added.
Thus when a node detects broken links it sends error
messages to other nodes that are in its cot. An error
message will contain a MAC, which is computed using
shared keys. When a node receives link errors, it au-
thenticates the sender and verifies the MAC using their
shared key. If the MAC is valid, it updates its trust-
pathways table, and if other links to a destination do
not exist, it re-sends error messages to other nodes in
its cot.
Negotiations Once link information exists in ei-
ther the cot or the trust-pathways tables, nodes can
prioritise ’next hop’ nodes based on link weights. The
more the TCs/weights the more the chances of having
a successful negotiation though not necessarily a guar-
antee that negotiations will be successful. Similarly,
each intermediary node that acts as a hop in the nego-
tiation process prioritised their links with other nodes
Figure 4: VOTES Architecture
based on weights for their negotiations. Our initial ex-
periments showed on average about 10-15% successful
negotiation rate for ABAC in a dispersed network.
5 VOTES
The VOTES project[16] is focused upon development
of clinical trials infrastructures using Grid technolo-
gies. A beta version architecture and implementation
is in place for exploring scenarios of federating data
across the clinical domain. Figure 4 shows the archi-
tecture, with various Grid technologies and a pool of
databases housing representative clinical data in ac-
tual NHS service resources. The authorization security
implemented is composed of local resources (i.e. the
database pool) providing local access control policies,
and a larger-scale VO-wide access matrix, which is an
aggregation of these local policies.
This access control matrix lists individual param-
eters within each database and matches them against
the various roles that have been defined for a particular
trial. In the prototype constructed so far, this access
matrix model is essentially a centralised model for a
given node (for instance, Glasgow). But in the wider
scope of the VOTES project, the vision is that nodes
at other sites (such as Oxford or Manchester) will join
the virtual organisation and share seamless, but secure,
access to their resources with the Glasgow node3.
This peer-to-peer model brings up the issue of how
the access matrix authorization policy between two
sites will be shared. For virtual organisations to be
truly flexible, nodes requesting to join the VO need
not necessarily be known or trusted by all other nodes.
The DTN provides the mechanism by which two ini-
tial strangers can establish trust through the exchange
of security credentials. If a node that is not known to
3Based on the definition of a ”Grid” model, these nodes are
equally dispensable, with the overall system relying on no single
entity.
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all VO nodes, requests to collaborate across the VO
require the node to have a credential-based trust rela-
tionship with at least one of the nodes in the VO (i.e.
a mutual friend). Using DTN a trust path can then be
established between the new node and the rest of the
VO, allowing their incorporation into the VO.
By extension, when a new node, with a set of new
databases is added to the VO (after establishing trust
using the DTN model), the access matrix within all
the nodes will be able to query the meta-data of these
new databases and populate itself with the necessary
parameters and descriptions. The resources within this
new node will then be available for querying as part of
the VO.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a dynamic trust nego-
tiation (DTN) model for the discovery and realisation
of trust between strangers, which makes distributed
authorisation possible in a collaborative environment.
This model differs from ATN models with the introduc-
tion of locally trusted intermediary parties that pro-
vide multiple negotiation and delegations hops, which
protects credentials and access policies in collaborative
environments. DTN explores trust relationships that
exist between collaborators to discover trust pathways
through which trust can be negotiated.
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